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Abstract: The Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) is the temporary, federal 
high-risk pool created under the Affordable Care Act to provide coverage to uninsured 
individuals with preexisting conditions until 2014, when exchange coverage becomes avail-
able to them. Nearly 78,000 people have enrolled since the program was implemented 
two years ago. This issue brief compares the PCIP with state-based high-risk pools that 
existed prior to the Affordable Care Act and considers programmatic differences that may 
have resulted in lower-than-anticipated enrollment and higher-than-anticipated costs for 
the PCIP. PCIP coverage, like state high-risk pool coverage, likely remains unaffordable 
to most lower-income individuals with preexisting conditions, but provides much needed 
access to care for those able to afford it. Operational costs of these programs are also quite 
high, making them less than optimal as a means of broader coverage expansion.
                    
OVERVIEW
The Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) program is a national, tem-
porary high-risk health insurance pool implemented as part of the Affordable 
Care Act. Its purpose is to provide a source of health insurance coverage for unin-
sured individuals with preexisting conditions until the exchanges are implemented 
in 2014 and individuals can no longer be denied coverage on the basis of their 
health history. The PCIP programs were implemented in each state between July 
and October 2010. To date, nearly 78,000 people have enrolled (Exhibits 1 and 2). 
Enrollment has been lower than initially projected while per member per month 
(PMPM) costs have been greater, suggesting that enrollees have more medical 
need than originally anticipated.1,2,3
To better understand the PCIP experience, this issue brief compares the 
PCIP with state-based high-risk pools that existed prior to the Affordable Care 
Act and considers programmatic differences that may have resulted in lower-
than-anticipated enrollment and higher-than-anticipated costs for the PCIP.
PCIP coverage is generally more affordable to individuals than state high-
risk pool coverage and purposefully does not impose a waiting period for coverage 
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of preexisting conditions—as most state high-risk 
pools do—so that more people with serious conditions 
can immediately access coverage. These PCIP features 
that have increased access to coverage also are likely to 
have led to higher per-person program costs. Because 
of these programmatic differences, implementation of 
the PCIPs has provided a natural experiment to test 
the feasibility of an expanded and affordable high-
risk pool program as a permanent vehicle for coverage 
expansion. As this issue brief illustrates, using high-
risk pools as an alternative to the provisions in the 
Affordable Care Act to cover the substantial remaining 
uninsured population with preexisting conditions 
would be extremely expensive and likely unsustainable. 
Under the law, in 2014, risk will be broadly pooled in 
the expanded Medicaid program for individuals with 
incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty level 
($30,657 for a family of four) and in the state insurance 
exchanges that will include people with and without 
health problems. In addition, premium and cost-shar-
ing subsidies will make health insurance sold through 
the state exchanges more affordable for people with 
incomes below 400 percent of poverty ($92,200 for a 
family of four).


































Alabama 1-Aug 33 77 118 230 340 429 559 2,133
Alaska 1-Sep 12 32 38 45 44 42 45 525
Arizona 1-Aug 112 374 639 1,178 1,783 2,448 3,282 NA
Arkansas 1-Sep 127 198 254 310 404 554 648 2,801
California 25-Oct 513 1,543 2,659 3,745 5,599 7,634 10,402 6,334
Colorado 1-Sep 368 617 807 964 1,054 1,171 1,333 13,859
Connecticut 1-Sep 12 51 57 73 163 265 440 1,603
Delaware 1-Aug 13 41 73 107 153 200 231 NA
District of Columbia 1-Oct 0 15 30 37 38 48 57 NA
Florida 1-Aug 293 770 1,201 2,381 3,736 5,232 7,114 208
Georgia 1-Aug 161 515 822 1,177 1,476 1,883 2,386 NA
Hawaii 1-Aug 11 24 45 63 78 101 122 NA
Idaho 1-Aug 19 43 79 145 316 514 707 1,658
Illinois 1-Sep 664 1,150 1,491 1,784 1,962 2,231 2,717 19,998
Indiana 1-Aug 63 177 273 471 678 968 1,316 7,502
Iowa 1-Sep 56 129 161 200 238 279 310 3,268
Kansas 1-Aug 81 161 216 268 301 356 430 1,528
Kentucky 1-Aug 23 77 140 264 435 641 867 4,798
Louisiana 1-Aug 31 121 166 267 377 676 979 1,728
Maine 1-Aug 13 13 18 31 30 36 43 NA
Maryland 1-Sep 62 298 430 607 741 876 999 20,646
Massachusetts 1-Aug 0 0 1 1 5 14 19 NA
Michigan 1-Oct 36 184 339 527 789 1,100 1,567 NA
Minnesota 1-Aug 15 37 66 137 244 370 522 26,859
Mississippi 1-Aug 19 71 105 137 163 215 289 3,328
Missouri 15-Aug 101 289 433 683 1,031 1,254 1,563 4,009
Montana 1-Aug 149 198 236 262 280 306 331 2,878
Nebraska 1-Aug 12 49 79 117 174 230 314 4,021
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THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITION 
INSURANCE PLAN AND STATE-BASED 
HIGH-RISK POOLS
By statute, the PCIP cannot impose a waiting period 
for coverage of preexisting conditions; any person with 
a preexisting condition who has been uninsured for 
at least six months is potentially eligible for cover-
age. In addition, premiums for coverage must be no 
higher than the rate a healthy individual in the same 
age range would pay for coverage in the individual 
insurance market for the area in which the PCIP oper-
ates. No individual premium subsidy is provided, and 
federal funding under the law is used to offset losses 
resulting from claims that exceed premium income. 
Finally, enrollment is open to qualifying individuals 
throughout the year. Congress established these rules to 
provide immediate and more affordable coverage to the 
intended population of uninsured individuals who had 
previously been excluded from the individual insur-
ance market because of their preexisting conditions. 
However, PCIPs are not intended to replace existing 
coverage nor are they intended to extend coverage to 
those unable to afford to pay market-based rates—
which would require expenditures far in excess of the 


































Nevada 1-Aug 56 147 222 386 579 747 976 NA
New Hampshire 1-Jul 43 123 183 233 306 424 510 2,586
New Jersey 15-Aug 108 416 670 702 794 892 1,055 NA
New Mexico 1-Aug 133 322 498 645 805 963 1,155 8,442
New York 1-Oct 201 847 1,638 2,176 2,632 3,122 3,764 NA
North Carolina 1-Aug 513 1,106 1,671 2,341 2,889 3,566 4,383 8,160
North Dakota 1-Aug 1 6 13 23 32 49 72 1,446
Ohio 1-Sep 634 1,024 1,398 1,771 2,137 2,480 2,819 NA
Oklahoma 1-Sep 148 262 380 471 576 689 788 2,422
Oregon 1-Aug 340 734 919 1,102 1,187 1,261 1,556 12,152
Pennsylvania 1-Oct 1,657 2,684 3,617 4,101 4,567 5,111 5,839 NA
Rhode Island 15-Sep 78 102 125 134 136 160 161 NA
South Carolina 1-Aug 104 309 504 743 948 1,209 1,457 1,799
South Dakota 15-Jul 43 94 105 133 153 170 190 645
Tennessee 1-Aug 43 255 419 655 878 1,102 1,385 3,265
Texas 1-Aug 393 1,298 2,020 2,967 4,029 5,092 6,623 24,792
Utah 1-Sep 73 223 395 568 696 860 1,005 3,946
Vermont 1-Sep 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 NA
Virginia 1-Aug 75 268 424 693 982 1,343 1,796 NA
Washington 1-Sep 75 304 446 586 708 765 842 3,862
West Virginia 1-Sep 4 18 30 48 76 108 132 1,152
Wisconsin 1-Aug 248 456 676 822 1,000 1,256 1,546 21,317
Wyoming 1-Aug 17 61 87 113 137 175 230 945
Total 7,986 18,313 27,416 37,624 48,879 61,619 77,877 226,615
State 6,488 13,560 19,860 25,284 31,222 37,823 46,441
Federal 1,498 4,753 7,556 12,340 17,657 23,796 31,436
Percent federal 19% 26% 28% 33% 36% 39% 40%
Notes: Shaded states have a federally administered PCIP.  NA denotes states (n=15) that do not have a state high-risk pool. 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “State by State Enrollment in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan, as of June 30, 2012,“  
available at http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2012/08/pcip08102012a.html.
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$5 billion set aside for this program. Rather, they are 
a short-term solution for individuals who could oth-
erwise afford nongroup coverage were it not for their 
preexisting conditions.
Currently, 27 states administer the PCIP pro-
gram for their residents while 23 states and the District 
of Columbia allow the federal government to adminis-
ter their PCIPs.4,5 Twenty of the 27 states that admin-
ister a PCIP program also administer a state-based 
high-risk pool in parallel with the PCIP, providing the 
opportunity to compare experiences between the two 
risk-pool programs.6
Overall, 35 states operate state-based high-
risk pools, which have existed in some states since 
the 1970s, with a total national enrollment of about 
226,000 (Exhibit 1). In contrast to the PCIP, these 
state-based pools have premiums that range from 100 
percent to 200 percent of rates paid in the local non-
group market, though some states provide low-income 
subsidies. All states, with the exception of Alabama, 
impose a waiting period for coverage of the preexisting 
condition of three to 12 months. During the waiting 
period, conditions not existing prior to enrollment are 
covered. The waiting period is waived for individuals 
transitioning directly from other coverage, including 
people who have exhausted COBRA eligibility.7 The 
PCIP program, in contrast, does not allow people to 
transition directly from other coverage because of the 
six-month uninsurance requirement. No exception is 
made for those exhausting COBRA benefits.
Given these eligibility and operational differ-
ences between the PCIP and state high-risk pools, it 
is not surprising that pronounced differences in char-
acteristics between enrollees in the two programs have 
become apparent since the PCIPs have been operating. 
These differences in enrollee characteristics and the 
associated costs are timely and relevant to understand-
ing the importance of certain plan design features in 
coverage for people with preexisting conditions.
By definition, both the PCIP program and the 
state high-risk pools operate at a loss. Income from 
premiums is insufficient to cover claims incurred by 
enrollees—who often have multiple chronic and costly 
conditions—meaning that medical loss ratios (MLRs), 
or the ratios of paid medical claims to premium reve-
nue, for state high-risk pools and PCIPs always exceed 
100 percent.8,9 The Affordable Care Act requires that 
private insurers have minimum MLRs of 80 percent 
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to 85 percent, with the remaining 15 percent to 20 
percent allowed for administrative costs and profits. 
An MLR exceeding 100 percent, however, means that 
the insurer is collecting less in premiums than the cost 
of claims and requires a substantial direct subsidy to 
maintain program viability. State high-risk pool pre-
miums, which are well above the standard premium in 
the individual market for a healthy person, cover only 
53 percent of the cost of claims, on average.10 State 
high-risk pools therefore depend on external sources 
to break even, including assessments charged to health 
carriers and hospitals and, in a few cases, state general 
tax funds. In addition, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) has provided limited grant 
funding to states to offset their high-risk pool losses. 
For the PCIP program, the $5 billion one-time alloca-
tion included in the health reform legislation covers the 
difference between premium income and claims costs 
until exchanges become available in 2014. Although 
some state-administered PCIP programs with particu-
larly high costs have had to request additional funds 
from the $5 billion allocation, the overall current level 
of spending is not on track to exceed the allocation.11
Despite the fact that both PCIPs and state 
high-risk pools enroll people with preexisting condi-
tions, PCIPs appear to be attracting individuals with 
more high-cost conditions. Exhibit 3 compares annual 
MLRs for the PCIP program and state high-risk pools 
in 20 states. The MLRs for the PCIP programs are 
substantially greater than those for state pools, by as 
much as a factor of eight. Even after correcting for the 
somewhat higher premiums paid by state high-risk 
pool members (adjusted MLRs, Exhibit 3, column 4), 
the MLRs for the PCIPs are up to seven times higher. 
Similarly, per member per month costs (i.e., aver-
age monthly costs for enrollees) are nearly nine times 
higher in the PCIP programs than in the correspond-
ing state high-risk pools, confirming the greater dis-
ease burden of PCIP enrollees (Exhibit 4). Although 
no studies have compared the prevalence of health 
problems among PCIP and state pool enrollees, initial 
health care utilization by PCIP enrollees suggests they 
have more, and more expensive, conditions than their 
state pool counterparts. An early analysis of a sample of 
PCIP claims, for example, showed high rates of costly 
conditions such as cancer (see Appendix).
A key eligibility requirement for the PCIP 
program is that individuals have been uninsured for at 
least six months, which is not the case for state high-
risk pool eligibility. This six-month uninsurance pro-
vision is generally recognized as necessary to prevent 
“crowd-out” from private insurance—that is, people 
dropping their existing coverage to enroll in the PCIP. 
As enacted, the provision prevents people with current 
or recent coverage from transitioning immediately to 
the PCIP, including those enrolled in state pools, who 
may be paying substantially higher premiums or fac-
ing higher deductibles, and those who have exhausted 
COBRA benefits. The requirement also serves to 
prioritize coverage availability to people who did not 
have it, which is a stated intention of the health reform 
legislation.
The uninsurance requirement may also be a fac-
tor in the higher cost of PCIP enrollees. People who 
have been uninsured often have pent-up, high-cost 
health care needs. In addition, these individuals may 
not have a regular source of care and may not initially 
use coverage in optimal or cost-effective ways.12,13,14,15
Regulations also prohibit PCIP programs from 
having limited open enrollment periods and from 
imposing any waiting period for coverage of a preex-
isting condition. These provisions have undoubtedly 
been life-saving for many individuals who enrolled 
in the program to address a health crisis. Indeed, in 
an effort to reach those most in need of the coverage, 
PCIP administrators conducted outreach to disease-
specific organizations to inform their members of the 
availability of coverage and actively enrolled uninsured 
individuals already in the hospital. In this respect, the 
PCIPs have truly played their intended role of provid-
ing coverage to people with acute need and no other 
coverage options. On the other hand, these individuals 
had immediate and often high-cost needs that have 
resulted in higher per member per month costs relative 
to the state high-risk pools.
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Exhibit 3. Medical Loss Ratios (MLRs) of PCIP 








Alaska 1,010% 350% 455%
Arkansas 303% 138%b 207%
California 726% 133% —c
Colorado 836% 181% 237%
Connecticut 289% 135% 202%
Illinois 500% 177% 232%
Iowa 430% 200% 300%
Kansas 824% 203% 262%
Maryland 620% 189% 189%
Missouri 570% 145% 189%
Montana 665% 161% 216%
New Hampshire 1,230% 140% 175%
New Mexico 1,151% 442% 345%d
North Carolina 217% 105% 147%
Ohio 458% NA NA
Oklahoma 673%e 191% 287%
Oregon 484% 163% 191%
Utah 844% 149% 204%
Washington 470% 270% 305%





a Because most state HRP premiums are higher than standard risk rates,  
MLR is adjusted in the last column to reflect premiums priced at SRR.
b Arkansas’s MLR data are from 2010.
c California does not use an SRR.
d With low income subsidies, New Mexico’s HRP premiums are 78% of 
SRR, thus inflating their MLR; if premiums are adjusted to SRR, the loss 
ratio would decrease. 
e In Oklahoma and Wisconsin, reimbursement rates are lower for PCIP 
than for state HRP.
f Most states that have federally administered PCIPs do not have 
state high-risk pools. See Exhibit 1, shaded area, for a list of federally 
administered PCIPs.
Exhibit 4. Per Member Per Month (PMPM) Costs 
of Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) 
and State High-Risk Pool (HRP) Enrollees












New Hampshire $6,178 $694
New Mexico $2,757 $1,169
















a Arkansas’s MLR data are from 2010.
b In North Carolina, both pools are reimbursed at Medicare rates.
c Ohio does not have a state high-risk pool. 
d In Wisconsin and Oklahoma, reimbursement rates are lower for  
PCIP than for state HRP.
e Most states that have federally-administered PCIPs do not have  
state high risk pools. The five federally administered PCIPs listed  
above represent a random sample for comparison with state-
administered plans. See Exhibit 1, shaded area, for a complete list  
of federally administered PCIPs.
f Texas’s MLR data are from 2010.
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Clearly, PCIPs have enabled more people with 
preexisting conditions to obtain health insurance and 
mitigated their need for uncompensated care. Early 
enrollment data from a sample of PCIP programs 
showed higher rates of enrollment among young adults, 
ages 26 to 28, and also among older adults, ages 58 
to 62.16 Younger individuals in the PCIP experience 
a variety of high-cost conditions including epilepsy, 
cancer, lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and hemophilia. 
Even though the prevalence of such conditions is low 
(see Appendix), they account for a high proportion of 
expenditures. Because they no longer are eligible for 
coverage under a parent’s plan at age 26, and because 
many work in jobs that do not provide health insur-
ance, these individuals would likely have been unable 
to obtain coverage without the PCIP. Young women 
experiencing high-risk pregnancies—considered a 
preexisting condition—have also enrolled in PCIPs. 
Without these plans, these women might have been 
covered only via Medicaid or not at all. 
Similarly, higher enrollment of older adults 
ages 58 to 62 indicates that the PCIP is an important 
source of coverage for individuals who need a source 
of coverage until they qualify for Medicare.17 Because 
prevalence of chronic conditions also increases with 
age, this segment of the population is at greater risk of 
being uninsurable in the individual market. Indeed, 70 
percent of the uninsured population with any chronic 
condition is between the ages of 50 and 64.18
DISCUSSION
The PCIP program provides important information 
for better understanding the limitations of using high-
risk pools to expand coverage and segment risk. By 
making coverage more affordable via premiums that 
reflect local market rates for healthy people and more 
accessible by having no waiting period, the PCIP pro-
gram has allowed previously uninsurable individuals to 
afford health insurance. These plan features were essen-
tial to making immediate coverage available to those 
most in need. Perhaps because of these plan features, in 
combination with the fact that enrollees are uninsured 
for at least six months, PCIP enrollees have proven to 
have higher medical costs than people enrolled in state-
based high-risk pools.
Current proposals that call for repealing and 
replacing the Affordable Care Act would continue 
to rely on expanding high-risk pools as a solution to 
covering people with preexisting conditions.19,20 To 
make high-risk pool coverage affordable and acces-
sible to the remaining and much larger pool of lower-
income, uninsured individuals with chronic conditions, 
policymakers would need to include a mechanism to 
subsidize premiums and cost-sharing to at least the 
levels proposed for exchange plans. (See Exhibit 5 
for premiums and deductibles for PCIP programs by 
state.) And, if PCIPs or state high-risk pools were the 
mechanism for expansion, their benefits would also 
need to be broadened to meet the essential benefits 
package mandated for exchange plans, and programs 
would need to eliminate current lifetime limits on 
coverage. Further, the remaining uninsured individu-
als may experience high levels of pent-up need that 
initially will make their coverage costly. Using data 
from the federal Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS), Merlis determined that a total of 19.1 mil-
lion uninsured Americans have chronic conditions; 
among these, 5.5 million were individuals with incomes 
less than 400 percent of the federal poverty level and 
high-cost chronic conditions (i.e., at least 1.5 times 
higher than the standard costs for a given age group).21 
Another, more recent estimate of the number of indi-
viduals with preexisting conditions was based on lists 
of conditions commonly used to determine eligibility 
for state high-risk pools. The authors found that one 
of four individuals across all social and economic strata 
have preexisting conditions that would likely result in 
coverage denial.22 The authors estimate that at least 
11.6 million uninsured individuals meet high-risk pool 
admission criteria.
Currently, the cost of health care for people 
without health insurance is financed by themselves and 
their families, with the remainder paid by providers and 
taxpayers, and by higher premiums among the insured. 
Many of these uninsured individuals are saddled with 
massive medical debt that can limit their employment 
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Exhibit 5. PCIP Premiums and Deductibles by State
State





$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 







$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






California $1,500 medical $500 prescriptions $370–$428*
Colorado $2,500 medical $500 prescriptions (brand name) $497–$565*#
Connecticut $1,250 medical $250 prescriptions $381 (all ages)
Delaware
$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 















$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 








$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 












$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 













$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $100 prescription 
$2,500 medical, $100 prescription 











$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$2,000 medical, $500 prescription 
(indemnity plan) 































$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 












Pennsylvania $1,000 $283 (all ages)
Rhode Island $1,000 $474
South Carolina
$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 





South Dakota $2,000 $526#
Tennessee
$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$500 medical, $150 prescription 








$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 






$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 









$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 















$1,000 medical, $250 prescription 





Note: All deductibles are for in-network services. Separate deductibles for  
out-of-network services apply in some cases.  
* Rate varies by residence location. 
# Non–tobacco-user rate.
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opportunities and result in personal bankruptcy.23,24 
Estimated claims costs for a comprehensive high-risk 
pool are as high as $100 billion annually.25 Although 
premiums would offset some of these costs, additional 
funding for subsidies that would make premiums 
and cost-sharing affordable would be substantial. Yet, 
preliminary proposals for high-risk pool expansion 
by those who oppose the Affordable Care Act do not 
address the need for additional revenue to offset these 
costs.26,27 Both the PCIP and state high-risk pool cost 
experiences illustrate the inadvisability of extending 
this form of coverage to a large number of people.
The overarching strategy of the Affordable 
Care Act is to create an exchange pool large enough 
to absorb and offset these costs while providing com-
prehensive and affordable coverage to all enrollees. 
Numerous provisions of the law work toward this end. 
The individual requirement to have health insurance, in 
particular, is designed to ensure enrollment of healthier 
individuals and adequately spread risk, resulting in 
lower per member per month costs for all plans.28 
Subsidies will also be provided to make coverage more 
affordable for lower-income individuals, regardless of 
health status, again broadening the pool and lowering 
average costs for all. Finally, the law’s ban on setting 
premiums on the basis of a person’s health status will 
result in lower administrative costs for exchange plans, 
with potentially lower premiums for enrollees.29
CONCLUSION
Despite the lower-than-anticipated enrollment and 
higher-than-anticipated costs, PCIPs appear to be 
performing their intended role as a bridge program, 
reducing costs of catastrophic medical liabilities for 
individuals and providers and improving access to 
care, including preventive and life-sustaining services. 
PCIP enrollment continues to grow steadily; however, 
because premiums are priced at the regular rates for 
nongroup coverage, enrollment is likely limited to peo-
ple with relatively higher incomes. Given the general 
lack of affordability of high-risk pool coverage at the 
individual level and the high costs of plan operation, 
the potential of high-risk pools as a vehicle for cover-
age expansion remains quite limited. In short, the only 
way to make insurance affordable for everyone is to 
make sure that everyone has insurance.
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Appendix. Comorbidities of 10 States’ PCIP Enrollees a
Condition (ICD-9 Codes) N b
Percent  
of sample
Immune disorders (042, V08, 279, 695.4) 48 3.2
HIV (042, V08) 44 3.0
Cancers (140–65, 170–72, 174–76, 179–208, 209.0–209.3, 230–34, 237.7, 237.8, 
511.81, 789.51, V58.0–.12, V66.1–.2)
197 13.3
Endocrine (245.2–.3, 250, 252.01, 253, 255, 275, 277.1–.6, 277.8–.9, 758.7,  
V45.85, V58.67)
249 16.8
Diabetes (250) 219 14.7
Blood disorders (281.0, 282–90) 142 9.6
Psychiatric disorders (290, 294–301, 309.81, 310–11, V11.0–.1) 218 14.7
Neurological disorders (326, 327.2, 330–37, 340–45, 350–359) 135 9.1
Sensory disorders (360–65, 369, 386–89) 59 4.0
Vision (360–65, 369) 37 2.5
Hearing (386–89) 22 1.5
Cardiovascular disorders (393–98, 402, 410–17, 420–29, 440–53, V43.2–.3, V45.0, 
V53.3)
228 15.4
Stroke and cerebrovascular disorders (430–38) 41 2.8
Respiratory disorders (491–96, 500–07, 518, V46.1–.2) 140 9.4
Digestive disorders (070, 555–56, 569.6–569.7, V44.1–44.4, V55.1–55.4, 570–73, 
577)
117 7.9
Renal disorders (580–86, V44.5–.6, V45.1, V55.5, V56) 36 2.4
Arthropathies (274, 696.0, 710–19, 725) 277 18.7
Dorsopathies (720–24, 731, 737, 738.4–738.6, 741) 219 14.7
Cancer history (V10, 457.0) 49 3.3
Transplant history or need (V42, V49.83, 996.8) 9 0.6
High-risk pregnancy (641, 649, 651, 654.5, 655–57, V23, V91) 34 2.3
a Based on a sample of claims incurred between July 1 and December 31, 2010. The 10 states represented in this table are  
Alaska, California, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin.
b n = 1,485 enrollees with at least two months enrollment and at least three medical claims.
Source: J. P. Hall and J. M. Moore, Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: Early Implementation of Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans:  
Providing an Interim Safety Net for the Uninsurable (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, June 2011).
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